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Opposition and Social-Democratic Change
in Africa: The Social Democratic Front
in Cameroon
PIET KONINGS
This article assesses the role of opposition parties in Africa’s demo-
cratic transition by focusing on the Social Democratic Front (SDF) in
Cameroon, one of the largest and most popular opposition parties in
Africa. Several explanations are offered as to why the SDF has failed
to seize power and effect social-democratic change in the country and
why the party displays a lack of consensus on the so-called ‘Anglophone
problem’. The regime’s repressive and divisive tactics, western donors’
ambivalent and inconsistent attitudes towards democratic governance
in the country, and the party leadership’s deep divisions about future
lines of action and strategy and its growing involvement in prebendal
politics are all discussed.
The functioning of opposition parties in Africa’s current democratic transition
appears still to be understudied and the existing literature usually presents a
rather negative picture of their role.1 Opposition parties are assumed to be
small, badly organised, fragmented, ethnocentric and dominated by personal
and clientelist relations of power that are claimed to be characteristic of
African politics.2 And, even more importantly, they are said to lack any clear,
well-articulated, socio-economic project that can serve as a viable and credible
alternative to existing policies and deepen and consolidate the democratic
process. Most electoral campaigns appear to be conducted on the basis of the
personality of the opposition leaders, and ethno-regional solidarities.
Opposition parties have to operate in what has been described as ‘illiberal
democracies’.3 In most African countries, the opposition has been faced with
incumbents who have only reluctantly conceded to a multi-party system but
have stopped at nothing in their attempts to obstruct, weaken, harass and
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divide the opposition. The latter have not hesitated to employ the public media
and the various apparatuses of the state – including the security forces –
against the opposition and to extensively rig election results. Today, the oppo-
sition is in a state of crisis and disintegrating in the majority of those countries
where it has not yet managed to unseat the incumbent regime.
In this article, I focus on the Social Democratic Front (SDF) in Cameroon
that was founded in May 1990. Initially, this party appeared to form a notable
exception to the generally negative assessment of the functioning of opposi-
tion parties in Africa and actually raised high expectations among the urban
masses of imminent political and economic change for two main reasons.4
First, there was the charisma of its leader, John Fru Ndi, and second, there
was its social-democratic message that seemed to be different from the author-
itarian and neo-liberal economic policies of the ruling regime. Though never
well defined, its message of establishing a truly democratic and just society –
translated into simple slogans such as ‘power to the people and equal oppor-
tunities for all’ – was easily understood. In the early 1990s, the SDF was so
popular among the masses that many observers came to believe that it was
only a matter of time before the party would replace the ruling Cameroon
People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM). Today, more than thirteen years
after its launch, prospects of a SDF takeover of power appear bleak. Even
worse, and similar to most other opposition parties in Africa, the party has
lost most of its initial appeal and its leadership is deeply divided on policy
issues and strategy, and characterised by opportunism and ‘prebendal
politics’.
In the first part of this article, I describe the rapid expansion of the SDF, its
message and its major actions during its heyday in the early 1990s. In the
second part, I explain the reasons for the loss of the party’s initial momentum
and its failure to capture power.
T H E B I R T H A N D G R O W T H O F T H E S D F
Following independence and reunification in 1961, Cameroon moved quickly
towards the establishment of a one-party state and the concentration of power
in the president that was justified by the ruling regime in terms of essential pre-
requisites for national unity and development.5 This political system remained
largely intact until 1990 when widespread popular discontent emerged with
the deepening economic and political crisis, all the more marked because
Cameroon had been one of the most prosperous and most stable countries
in Sub-Saharan Africa until then. The majority of the population held the
corrupt, authoritarian Biya government responsible for the unprecedented
economic crisis, resulting in the loss of its legitimacy. General discontent
was fuelled by the increasing monopolisation of political and economic
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power by the Beti, President Biya’s own ethnic group. This signified a striking
departure from the policy of his predecessor, Ahmadou Ahidjo (1961–82)
who had attempted to achieve ‘ethnic balancing’ by co-opting representatives
of the various ethnic groups into a hegemonic alliance.6
In addition, with the move towards democratisation in Eastern Europe,
Cameroonians, like Africans elsewhere on the continent, began to demand
political reforms including the introduction of a multi-party system, rule of
law, and freedom of association and of the press. This went far beyond the
modest political reforms introduced earlier by the Biya government.7
It was in these circumstances that the first opposition party, the Social
Democratic Front (SDF), was formed in Bamenda, the capital of North West
Province in Anglophone Cameroon. Its charismatic leader, John Fru Ndi, a
bookseller by profession, defied government orders prohibiting the founding
of the party and chose 26 May 1990 as its launch date. On the same day
several decades before, Martin Luther King had led a march on Capitol Hill
in Washington where he made his famous ‘I Have a Dream’ speech, setting
the stage for the liberation of blacks in American society. In his short speech
to the massive rally in Ntarikon Park in Bamenda, Fru Ndi declared:
Today is the most significant day in the struggle for democracy in
Cameroon . . . . Democracy has never been handed down to a people
on a platter of gold . . . We have set as one of our goals to rid the Camer-
oonian society of a system that deprives people from being free men or
otherwise punishing them for daring to think freely, associate freely,
assemble peacefully and freely . . . . We call upon you to stand up and
be counted amongst those who share our democratic ideal. You have
nothing to lose but the straight jacket in which you, as freeborn citizens,
have been cast.8
Following this ceremony, six young Anglophones – who became known
as the ‘May 26 martyrs’ – were killed by the security forces. The state-
controlled media tried to distort the facts and to deny government respon-
sibility for this bloody event and a demonstration by Anglophone students at
the University of Yaoundé in support of the SDF and the introduction of a
multi-party system was brutally suppressed.9 The demonstrators were falsely
accused by the regime of having marched in favour of the re-integration of
Anglophone Cameroon into Nigeria and of singing the Nigerian national
anthem and raising the Nigerian flag.10 Leading members of the ruling party,
the Cameroon People’s Democratic Party (CPDM), strongly condemned the
Anglophones for their ‘treacherous actions’ and what they considered as the
premature birth of multipartyism in the post-colonial state. Their reaction to
these peaceful demonstrations shocked many people, particularly because
alternative political parties were not prohibited by the 1972 constitution.
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The government’s overreaction to the launch of the SDF and its continual
persecution of the party must be understood in the context of what is called the
‘Anglophone problem’. Several factors need to be taken into consideration in
explaining the emergence and development of this problem.11 Its roots can be
traced back as far as the partitioning after World War I of the erstwhile
German Cameroon Protectorate between the French and British victors, first
as mandates under the League of Nations and later as trusts under the
United Nations. The subsequent creation of territorial differences in language
and cultural legacy laid the historical foundation for the construction of
Anglophone and Francophone identities. An even more important factor
was the form of state that the Francophone majority more or less imposed
upon the Anglophone minority during constitutional negotiations for a reuni-
fied Cameroon in 1961. The Anglophone political elite had proposed a loose
form of federation, which they considered a safe guarantee for the equal partner-
ship of both parties and for the preservation of the cultural heritage and identity
of each side. The Francophone political elite instead opted for a highly centra-
lised form of federation that they considered as merely a transitory phase in
the establishment of a unitary state. By 1972 they had already succeeded in
transforming the federal state into a unitary state. The most decisive factor,
however, was the nation-state project after reunification. For the Anglophone
population, nation-building has been driven by the firm determination of
the Francophone political elite to dominate the Anglophone minority in the
post-colonial state and to erase the cultural and institutional foundations of
Anglophone identity. Gradually, this has created an Anglophone consciousness:
the feeling of being recolonised and marginalised in all spheres of public life
and thus becoming second-class citizens in their own country. It was not until
political liberalisation in 1990 that various associations and pressure groups
were created or reactivated by members of the Anglophone elite to represent
and defend Anglophone interests in the Francophone-dominated state. Although
the most important organisations initially called for a return to the federal state,
the persistent refusal of the Biya government to discuss any related
constitutional reforms eventually forced them to adopt a secessionist stand.
There is general agreement that the launching of the SDF was a decisive
factor in changing the political landscape in Cameroon. Under considerable
internal and external pressure, the government introduced a greater measure of
political liberalisation.12 In December 1990 it announced the advent of multi-
partyism, as well as a certain degree of freedom of mass communication and
association, including the right to hold public meetings and demonstrations.
As a result, several political parties, pressure groups and private newspapers
were set up in Cameroon and began to oppose the regime.
Like most other opposition parties that have emerged during the current
political liberalisation process in Cameroon and other African countries,13
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the SDF never appears to have developed any elaborate political or economic
programme. The charisma of the party leader is more likely to attract a mass
following than any explicit ideology. Since the tragic death in 1958
of Ruben Um Nyobe, the legendary leader of the Union des Populations
du Cameroun (UPC),14 no other politician in Cameroon has captured the
imagination of the masses with such enthusiasm as John Fru Ndi, the chair-
man of the SDF. His populist style of leadership has had a wide appeal.
Unlike most other Cameroonian political leaders, he usually wears custom-
ary dress, he predominantly speaks Pidgin English (the lingua franca of the
masses), and is admired for his courage and outspokenness. As a result of
Fru Ndi’s growing popularity, the party was able to extend its membership
from the Anglophone to the Francophone area, notably in the neighbouring
West and Littoral Provinces (see Map 1). In fact, Francophones soon
outnumbered Anglophones in the originally Anglophone party. Most
of the party’s approximately 60-per-cent Francophone membership belongs
to the ‘entrepreneurial’ Bamileke, who are closely related to ethnic groups in
the North West Province.15 The Bamileke are inclined to see the SDF as a
springboard to political power.
Examination of the party’s most important initial documents, the 1990
Constitution and Manifesto and the 1991 Proposals on Devolution of
Power, reveals an ideologically fluid mixture of populist, liberal and social-
democratic elements. The composition of the initial party leadership may be
MAP 1
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a significant explanatory factor for this ideological blend. In addition to the
populist Fru Ndi, the party leadership consisted of members of the radical
intelligentsia and other sectors of the middle classes, particularly teachers
and lawyers, as well as some businessmen and entrepreneurs. The major
tenets in the SDF basic documents are the following:
. the establishment of a ‘healthy and true’ democracy. In this respect, the
SDF has championed the achievement of a transparent and accountable
form of governance, the separation of executive, legislative and judiciary
powers, free and fair elections, freedom of expression and association, the
rule of law and respect for human rights. To introduce fair and free elec-
tions, the SDF has continuously advocated the introduction of an indepen-
dent electoral commission.
. the need for participatory democracy. In its 1991 Proposals on Devolution
of Power, the SDF attempted ‘to put into concrete form and detail its
avowed slogan of Power to the People’. By introducing a large measure
of decentralisation, the party proposed ‘to put an end to the former
system bedevilled by overcentralisation of decision-making with a huge
bureaucracy at the centre’ and ‘to get the common people themselves
directly involved in their own governance’.
. the promotion of a market economy, free enterprise, and the right to
private property.
. the creation of a welfare state, with particular concern for the underprivi-
leged in society. The SDF promised the introduction of free health care and
education, an improvement in the living and working conditions of urban
and rural workers (better housing, electricity and roads), the creation of
employment for the youth, and an improvement in the position of
women in society.
Although these basic documents failed to provide a credible political and
economic blueprint for achieving these objectives, they succeeded in attract-
ing not only the urban masses – formal and informal-sector workers and the
unemployed – but also business people and entrepreneurs.
The party’s message – embodied in simple slogans like ‘power to the
people and equal opportunity for all’, ‘change’ and ‘suffer don finish
(SDF)’, a Pidgin English expression meaning ‘your suffering has come to
an end’ – was well understood by the masses. They came to believe that by
voting the SDF into power, they would finally obtain a say in the decision-
making process and would be freed from exploitation and oppression.
The first years of political liberalisation raised high expectations among
SDF members of an imminent change in regime and a reconfiguration of
state power in their favour. The party’s enormous expansion and growing
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confidence put the government on the defensive, being unsure of how to
handle the sweeping force of the new political upstarts. The SDF’s weekly
rallies and demonstrations, its fiery rhetoric and violent threats, and its bold
defiance of the regime were all phenomena unimaginable in the three long
decades of predictable and colourless one-party politics.
The leaders of the SDF helped to turn most of the country, with the notable
exception of the Beti region, into a veritable hotbed of rebellion, leading to
several vehement confrontations with the regime in power. This was particu-
larly the case during the 1991–92 ‘ghost town’ campaign, which was essen-
tially a prolonged demonstration of civil disobedience organised by the SDF
and allied opposition parties to try to force the Biya government to organise
a sovereign national conference like those previously held in other African
countries such as Benin, Congo-Brazzaville, Mali and Zaire.16 This was a
period when the public was requested to immobilise the economy by
staying indoors, blocking streets, refusing to pay taxes and bills, and boycot-
ting markets and offices. The slogan adopted by the opposition alliance in
favour of a sovereign national conference was ‘fait quoi, fait quoi, il y
aura’ (‘nothing will prevent it being hold’). When Biya replied in a speech
before the national assembly that it was ‘sans objet’ (pointless), the whole
country reportedly went up in flames.
By October 1991, however, the ‘ghost town’ campaign had run out
of steam, and the regime then found it opportune to organise what it
called a ‘tripartite meeting’ involving the incumbent government, the opposi-
tion and well-known public figures.17 With the meeting masquerading as a
forum in which to reach a compromise on the main political issue – namely
the holding of a sovereign national conference – the regime used the occasion
to assess the strength of the opposition and, if possible, to divide it.
It soon became manifest that the opposition was unable to maintain a
united front in the absence of a common objective and programme. As else-
where in Africa,18 the overwhelming majority of the opposition parties in
Cameroon existed only on paper, usually having been created by political
entrepreneurs to serve personal and ethno-regional interests rather than to
mobilise popular forces for genuine change.19 As a result, the regime even-
tually succeeded in manipulating and blackmailing most of their leaders. Sub-
sequently, it was able to largely determine the agenda and control the meeting
to its own advantage. On 13 November 1991, no fewer than forty of the forty-
seven then legalised opposition parties signed the so-called Yaoundé Declara-
tion. They agreed to abandon the ‘ghost town’ campaign and to defer the
sovereign national conference demand pending elections in response to the
regime’s offer of further discussions on electoral and constitutional reform.
The SDF was not prepared to cooperate with the regime and refused to
sign the document.
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Having split the opposition during this meeting, the regime simply refused
to create an independent electoral commission, as had constantly been
demanded by the SDF. With a promised reward of FCFA 500 million for
each party participating in elections, it lured the majority of the opposition
parties into the ill-conceived parliamentary elections of March 1992. There
have been disputes ever since about the wisdom or folly of the SDF boycott
of these elections. It is beyond any doubt that SDF participation in these
contested elections would have given the opposition a majority vote in
the national assembly, thus posing a serious challenge to the regime (see
Table 1).
The SDF, however, did participate in the October 1992 presidential elec-
tions. Although the opposition parties failed to agree on a single candidate,
the SDF chairman, John Fru Ndi, performed extremely well in these fraudulent
elections. In fact, many Cameroonians and international observers believed that
he had won the presidency. It was therefore not surprising that Biya’s declared
victory was a traumatic experience for the SDF membership, resulting in violent
protests against the ‘theft of Fru Ndi’s victory’ throughout the North West Pro-
vince. The regime then imposed a state of emergency on the province for three
months and Fru Ndi was kept under house arrest in Bamenda.
Following the party’s failure to accede to political power through either
violent confrontation or the ballot box, a number of issues arose that
created serious divisions among its leadership, leading to growing disillusion-
ment among the rank and file. Moreover, having survived the most difficult
years in its existence, the incumbent regime used all the means at its disposal
to contain the SDF threat.
TABLE 1
RESULTS OF LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS IN CAMEROON
Parties Number of Seats
1992 1997 2002
Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM) 88 116 149
Social Democratic Front (SDF) 01 43 21
National Union for Democracy and Progress (NUDP) 68 13 1
Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC) 18 1 3
Cameroon Democratic Union (CDU) 01 5 5
Movement for the Defence of the Republic (MDR) 6 1 0
Mouvement Libéral des Jeunes du Cameroun (MLJC) 0 1 1
TOTAL 180 180 180
Note: 1The SDF and the CDU boycotted the 1992 legislative elections.
Source: Compiled from various Cameroonian newspapers.
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T H E A N G L O P H O N E - F R A N C O P H O N E D I V I D E W I T H I N T H E S D F
Paradoxically, although the SDF and Fru Ndi contributed immensely to
Anglophone consciousness and action, the party increasingly presented
itself as a national rather than an Anglophone party, as is evidenced by its
growing membership in Francophone Cameroon. As a consequence, it
adopted an ambivalent attitude towards calls from the newly emerging Anglo-
phone movements for a return to a two-state (Anglophone-Francophone) fed-
eration. Its leadership tried to avoid alienating either its Anglophone or its
Francophone members but this was not an easy task. The party’s Anglophone
members tended to be simultaneously supporters of Anglophone movements
and were therefore inclined to bring pressures to bear upon the party’s leader-
ship to place federalism on the political agenda.
Like most other Francophones,20 the Francophone party members tended
to oppose the Anglophone pursuit of a federal state – often equating federal-
ism with secession – and strongly adhered to the preservation of the unitary
state. They rightly pointed out that some of the party’s basic documents,
like the 1990 SDF Manifesto and the 1991 SDF Proposals on Devolution of
Power stressed the importance of national unity, allowing only for a large
measure of decentralisation within the unitary state. The Francophone position
was even largely backed by the party’s Anglophone secretary-general, Dr Siga
Asanga, who maintained close ties with the Francophone intellectuals in the
SDF leadership, most of them, like he himself, lecturers at the University of
Yaoundé. On some occasions, Asanga publicly stated that the party’s
embrace of the Anglophone cause and federalism would endanger its social-
democratic ideology and national appeal.21 The issue became even more per-
tinent when the Francophone majority demanded a more equal representation
in the still predominantly Anglophone party executive. Since the party chair-
man was an Anglophone, the Bamileke, who formed the largest part of the
Francophone membership, claimed to be entitled to the post of secretary-
general, which was second in the party’s hierarchy.
The party chairman, John Fru Ndi, was under pressure from both sides to
clarify his position on the growing Anglophone-Francophone divide in
the party and he eventually appeared to yield to Anglophone pressure. He
openly declared himself to be opposed to Francophone domination of the
SDF since the party owed its existence to courageous initiatives and sacrifices
by Anglophones. He bluntly added that ‘it was unacceptable that a Bamileke
would ever become secretary-general of the SDF’ – a statement reminiscent
of a similar declaration by Joseph Owona during his term as secretary-general
at the presidency: ‘A Bamileke as President? Never!’.22 Fru Ndi’s clarification
reinforced Anglophone influence in the party’s decision-making organs but
served to temper enthusiasm for the party among the Bamileke elite.
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At the SDF’s Bafousssam Convention in July 1993, some Anglophones
explicitly raised the issue of Anglophone marginalisation in the Francophone-
dominated post-colonial state, and the delegates subsequently endorsed in prin-
ciple the idea of a federal form of government. To appease the Francophones,
the party refused to adopt the two-state federation as advocated by the Anglo-
phone movements, leaving it instead to the people themselves to decide on the
exact form of federation at a future sovereign national conference. Only one
year later, on 22 August 1994, the SDF national executive committee modified
the Bafoussam declaration of federalism. It now clearly opted for a four-state
federation (an Anglophone state and three Francophone states). Partly as a
result of his disagreement with the party’s endorsement of federalism, Sec-
retary-General Siga Asanga was expelled from the party in 1995. A number
of Bamileke and other Francophone party leaders also left the party voluntarily
or were forced out. One of them, Dr Basil Kamdoum, then founded the Social
Democratic Party (SDP) that was intended to offer a social-democratic alterna-
tive to the SDF. However, it never really got off the ground, nor did the Social
Democratic Forum created by Siga Asanga to protest his expulsion from the
SDF. These leaders simply lacked Fru Ndi’s charisma.
From the mid-1990s onwards, there were also repeated, and sometimes
serious, conflicts between the leadership of the umbrella organisation of the
Anglophone movements, the Southern Cameroons National Council
(SCNC) and the SDF. While the SDF continued to cling to the idea of a
four-state federation, the SCNC had in the meantime adopted a secessionist
stand following the Biya government’s persistent refusal to enter into any
meaningful negotiations about a return to a two-state federation. The
SCNC’s new objective obliged the SDF leadership to distance itself from
the Anglophone cause in order to assure the party’s survival among its Fran-
cophone members. Evidently, it thereby ran the risk of losing support among
its Anglophone members.
When SCNC leaders proposed boycotting the 1996 municipal elections,
claiming that any elections called by the Francophone-dominated state were
irrelevant to an independent Southern Cameroons state,23 the SDF leadership
refused to comply. Relations rapidly deteriorated after the proclamation of the
restoration of the independence of the Federal Republic of Southern Camer-
oons (FRSC) by a SCNC leader, Justice Frederick Alobwede Ebong, on 30
December 1999. On 6 May 2000, the party executive met to discuss the
new developments on the Anglophone scene. During a stormy debate it
decided to demand the resignation of some important party leaders. Dr Nfor
Ngala Nfor, who used to be the chairman of the SDF Constitutional and Pol-
itical Affairs Committee, was asked to resign because of his recent acceptance
of the positions of vice-chairman of the SCNC and vice-president of the
FRSC. Dr Martin Luma, the second vice-president of the SDF, was asked to
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step down because he had chaired the historic meeting on 1 April 2000 at
which Justice Ebong was proclaimed president of the FRSC and Dr Nfor
Ngala Nfor was appointed as vice-president. Albert Mukong, a human
rights activist and SDF founding member, was also asked to resign because
of his persistent militancy in Anglophone organisations. Their departures
were clear proof of the SDF leadership’s determination to purge the party
of ‘extremist’ and separatist elements in order to maintain the support of its
Francophone membership.24
Professor Carlson Anyangwe, another SDF founding father and former
SCNC leader who is still working abroad, has also recently distanced
himself from the party, identifying himself more closely with the SCNC
struggle for an independent Southern Cameroons state. That the SDF leader-
ship is under strong pressure from its Francophone membership to maintain a
certain distance from the Anglophone separatist tendencies was manifested
again in June 2000 when Mr Chrétien Tabetsing, a Bamileke member of the
SDF living in France and who had failed to unseat John Fru Ndi as party chair-
man during the SDF’s 1999 convention, called for an extraordinary conven-
tion. The purpose of this convention, he said, was to debate the Anglophone
problem that had become such a sensitive issue in Cameroon and was dividing
the party into two opposing camps. He claimed that the SDF would collapse
and cease to exist should Anglophone wishes prevail.25
On 7 May 2000, the chairman of the SDF, John Fru Ndi, openly confessed that
his party was at variance with the SCNC over the strategic options for solving the
Anglophone problem. While his own party continues to view a four-state federa-
tion as a panacea for the Anglophone problem, the SCNC was, he lamented,
beating the drums of outright secession. He strongly condemned some SCNC
activists who were issuing threats against the SDF ‘in a bid to persuade the
party to dance to their independence song’. Instead of combating the Biya
regime, the SCNC, he alleged, was now engaged in fighting the SDF.26 A few
weeks later, a new clash between the SDF and the SCNC occurred when the
SDF decided to participate in the 20 May demonstrations – to commemorate
the creation of the unitary state – while the SCNC had called for a boycott.27
Dissatisfied with the party’s position towards the Anglophone problem, an
increasing number of both Anglophone and Francophone members have left
the party and many former Anglophone members have committed themselves
exclusively to the Anglophone cause.
T H E R E G I M E ’ S R E P R E S S I V E A N D D I V I S I V E T A C T I C S A N D
I T S I N T E R N A T I O N A L S U P P O R T
The regime has done everything possible to control the expansion and influ-
ence of the SDF and other opposition parties. One of its main strategies has
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been repression and SDF leaders and militants have found themselves continu-
ously exposed to harassment, intimidation and violence. A well-publicised
example occurred on 3 November 1993 – the day set aside to celebrate
eleven years of Biya’s presidency – and involved a confrontation between a
SDF convoy led by John Fru Ndi and the police in Yaoundé when the
police attacked the convoy with water canons. Fru Ndi was injured and his
car damaged but he escaped and took refuge in the residence of the Dutch
ambassador, subsequently giving an ultimatum for the release of the thirty
SDF militants arrested. The police were rumoured to have been intending to
kill him.28
Strikingly, the North West provincial governor, Bell Luc René, a Franco-
phone, became nicknamed ‘Bend Look Grenade’ for the excessive use of tear-
gas grenades by the security forces under his command to disperse SDF
demonstrators, especially during the 1991 ‘ghost town’ campaign and the
1992 state of emergency in Bamenda in the wake of ‘Biya’s theft of Fru
Ndi’s victory’ in the presidential elections. The government regularly prohib-
ited the SDF from holding rallies and meetings, and the security forces often
broke up those that did take place. Contrary to the SDF credo, ‘Suffer don
Finish’ (SDF), the suffering was clearly not finished and another reading for
its acronym emerged ‘Suffer dey (for) Front’ (SDF).
Other strategies by the regime to frustrate SDF members’ hopes of ever
gaining power included the almost complete barring of opposition parties
from access to the public media, the constant refusal to introduce free and
fair elections, and the extensive rigging of election results.29 Any appeal by
the SDF leadership to the courts against such practices was likely to fail
since the national judiciary continues to serve the interests of the incumbent
regime and not those of the citizens. Indeed, as Nyamnjoh aptly observed,30
‘Today Cameroonians have multipartyism but the one-party logic persists’.
The regime’s most important strategy has undoubtedly been divide-and-
rule. In the Anglophone region in particular, it has capitalised on the existing
ethno-regional tensions between the coastal forest (the present South West
Province) and the Grassfields (the present North West Province) people (see
Map 1). As argued elsewhere,31 a number of factors are responsible for this
situation. First, the large-scale labour migration from the North West to the
South West where a plantation economy was created during German colonial
rule,32 and the subsequent local settlement of northwestern workers. Gradu-
ally, these settlers have come to form the majority in many local towns and
villages, proving their reputation as entrepreneurs and achieving, along with
Nigerians of Igbo descent, a dominant position in the southwestern
economy.33 Second, the transfer of political power from the South West to
the North West in 1959, when the North West-based Kamerun National
Democratic Party (KNDP) defeated the ruling South West-based Kamerun
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National Convention (KNC) and the North West elite started dominating the
political scene at the regional and national levels.34 Consequently, although
supporting most of the Anglophone grievances about Francophone domina-
tion, the South West elite have felt more disadvantaged than their northwes-
tern counterparts in the post-colonial state.
Political liberalisation in the early 1990s fanned the rivalry between the
South West and North West elites in their struggle for power at the regional
and national levels. The rapid growth of the SDF immediately alarmed
the South West elite who feared renewed North West domination over the
South West as the SDF was clearly a party organised and controlled by the
North West elite. Moreover, although the party, like the former KNDP,
enjoyed less popularity among the autochthonous population in the South
West than in the North West, it could nevertheless count on massive
support from northwestern workers and settlers in the region. In addition, it
soon became manifest that the SDF’s frequent, and often violent, confronta-
tions with the regime had the paradoxical effect of advancing the political
careers of northwestern politicians. The year 1992 witnessed first the appoint-
ment of a North Westerner, Simon Achidi Achu, as prime minister – an appar-
ent attempt by the desperate regime to contain the enormous popularity of the
SDF in the North West – and later the spectacular performance of the charis-
matic SDF chairman, John Fru Ndi, in the presidential elections.
Given the intensification of the power struggle between the South West
and North West elites during the political liberalisation process, the Biya gov-
ernment found it increasingly lucrative and politically expedient to tempt the
‘peaceful and conciliatory’ South West elite away from Anglophone solidarity
with strategic appointments and the idea that their real enemy was the ‘unpa-
triotic, ungrateful and power-mongering’ North West elite.
In response to South West complaints of North West domination, Biya
began to appoint South Westerners to key positions in their own province.
For example, Dorothy Njeuma was appointed vice-chancellor of the newly
created Anglophone University of Buea and Becky Ndive was transferred
from Yaoundé to head the Cameroon Radio and Television (CRTV) station
in the South West. Nevertheless, South Westerners still felt underrepresented
in higher government positions and constantly requested that a South Wester-
ner succeed the North Westerner, Simon Achidi Achu, as prime minister. So
when in September 1996, Biya appointed the South Westerner Peter Mafany
Musonge as prime minister and kept more South Westerners than North Wes-
terners in key cabinet positions, ‘the South West people . . . went wild with
excitement and jubilation and loudly praised the Head of State’ for having
at last listened to the cries of despair of South Westerners, who for over
thirty-six years had been ‘confined to the periphery of national politics and
socio-economic development’.35
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Government divide-and-rule tactics culminated in the 1996 constitution
that promised special state protection for autochthonous minorities.36 Not
unexpectedly, the new constitution boosted South West identity and fuelled
existing tensions between South Westerners and North Westerners.
The timing of its release was hardly an accident: it was promulgated only a
few days before the 21 January 1996 municipal elections. The South West pro-
CPDM elite was shocked when the SDF won most key urban constituencies in
their region. South West Governor Peter Oben Ashu immediately blamed the
northwestern settlers, who outnumbered the indigenes in most urban areas of
the province, for the CPDM’s poor performance in the urban areas, and on
several occasions he and other members of the southwestern elite ordered
them ‘to go home’. Before the elections, Nfon Victor Mukete, the Bafaw Para-
mount Chief in Kumba, had used Bafaw vigilante groups to ‘encourage’ north-
western settlers in the Kumba municipal areas not to vote for the SDF. The South
West elite immediately started demanding state protection for the autochthonous
southwestern minority against the dominant and exploitative North Westerners.
Straight after the elections, the government provided the required protec-
tion by appointing indigenous CPDM leaders as urban delegates in the
municipalities won by the SDF. It is beyond doubt that the Biya regime
also rendered assistance after the municipal elections to the so-called Grand
Sawa movement37 – an emerging alignment of the ethnically related
coastal elite in the South West Province and neighbouring Francophone Lit-
toral Province on the basis of common feelings of exploitation by northwes-
tern and ethnically related Bamileke settlers who were believed to
constitute the backbone of the major opposition party, the SDF.38
To those who sought protection as minorities, the price to pay would
increasingly be stated in no uncertain terms: Vote for the CPDM. This is
exactly what the new prime minister, Peter Mafany Musonge, and other
members of the southwestern elite have been telling the people in the region.
During elections, the southwestern pro-CPDM elites have become accus-
tomed either to excluding northwestern settlers from voting in the South West
or to bringing pressure to bear upon them to vote for the CPDM. According to
the Cameroon Electoral Code,39 every citizen may vote in a locality where s/
he has been resident for at least six months or where his/her name is on the
income-tax assessment list for the fifth consecutive year. Despite such rules,
northwestern settlers, especially those known to be SDF supporters, were fre-
quently barred from voting in their area of residence and were requested to do
so in their region of origin (only to discover on their arrival that they were sup-
posed to vote in their place of residence). During a meeting of the South West
elite in Limbe in February 1997 it was decided that settlers had to obtain a
residence certificate as a precondition for being registered as a voter – a
decision which North Westerners immediately condemned as favouring the
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party in power.40 Although this rule was in clear contravention of the electoral
code, pro-CPDM officials and chiefs, like Governor Peter Oben Ashu and
Chief Mukete of Kumba, continued to insist on the obtaining of these
permits. Northwestern workers, the majority of whom are SDF supporters,
have also been subjected to persistent CPDM pressures to support the new
southwestern prime minister Peter Mafany Musonge by voting CPDM.
And last but not least, the regime could count at the last moment on inter-
national support, despite the donors’ regular criticisms of the slow progress of
economic and political reforms in Cameroon. France in particular has contin-
ued to defend the Biya government, seeing a takeover of power by the SDF as
a severe threat to its long-standing vested interests in the country.41 Its support
for the regime was even reinforced by hostile declarations and actions on the
part of the SDF chairman. During the SDF’s early years, Fru Ndi regularly
declared that his party was fighting not only a local dictator but also French
imperialism, even calling upon his followers to boycott French goods.
France, therefore, did everything it could to make sure that Biya remained
in power during the controversial October 1992 presidential elections. A
few months afterwards, the French minister of interior, Charles Pasqua, justi-
fied French actions by declaring that ‘an Anglophone cannot be president of
Cameroon’.42 When international donors decided to suspend their allocation
of structural adjustment loans to the regime after these elections, Cameroon
became first on the list of French aid beneficiaries in 1993 and France
rescued the regime with two new loans.
According to Fonchingong,43 the French also sought to discredit the SDF
and its Anglophone leadership in various ways. For instance, the French secret
police are said to have fabricated incriminating documents linking Fru Ndi to
illegal arms imports. Moreover, the French ambassador, Gilles Vidal, and
other French embassy officials undertook several missions to the Francophone
stronghold of the SDF, the West Province, to persuade the Bamileke elite and
traditional rulers to distance themselves from the SDF. In addition, they
encouraged the regime to create satellite parties with Bamileke leadership
so as to weaken local support for the SDF. There are even secret reports
that France and the CPDM regime were sponsoring a Bamileke front within
the SDF in a bid either to grab the chairmanship of the Anglophone Fru Ndi
or spark disorder in the party.
Curiously, the other international donors have never publicly contested
French partisanship, most probably out of consideration for the longstanding
and close relations between France and Cameroon. While continuously stres-
sing the need for ‘good governance’, they themselves have actually displayed
a rather ambivalent attitude towards the regime, often justified in terms of
‘realpolitik’. The United States is a good example in this respect. By the
end of 1994, the United States Agency for International Development
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(USAID) had decided to stop its activities in the country after having con-
cluded that ‘the undemocratic political climate in Cameroon did not permit
aid to be utilised in the most judicious manner’.44 This drastic action,
however, does not alter the fact that the United States has been of great assist-
ance to the regime through regular debt-rescheduling agreements, without
which it might have collapsed.
The Commonwealth’s performance has been particularly disappointing
for the Anglophone population.45 Following Cameroon’s application for
Commonwealth membership in 1989, the SDF and the Anglophone move-
ments frequently appealed to the Commonwealth authorities to keep Camer-
oon out of the Commonwealth until the Biya government had realised
significant democratic reforms, improved its poor human-rights record and
accepted the Anglophone proposal for a federal structure. To the consternation
of the Anglophone leaders, it was announced on 16 October 1995 that Camer-
oon had been admitted to the Commonwealth.
There appear to have been two reasons for its admission. First, the Com-
monwealth found it hard to reject Cameroon’s application on the basis of the
1991 Harare Declaration as there was ample evidence that the democratic
records of some of its African member states, like Nigeria and Kenya, were
even poorer than Cameroon’s. Second, the Commonwealth generally believed
that admission would be a more effective option than non-admission in terms
of the advancement of democratisation in Cameroon. Once in, Common-
wealth members would be able to bring pressure to bear on the Cameroonian
government to introduce political reforms.
Since admission, the Commonwealth has sent regular missions to Cameroon
to urge the government to speed up the democratisation process, including the
introduction of fair elections. All these efforts appear to have had minimal
effect in spite of repeated promises by the Biya government to execute some
of the Commonwealth’s proposals for reform and seek financial assistance for
their implementation.46 Nevertheless, the Commonwealth authorities have not
yet resorted to any punitive measures, such as the withdrawal of financial assist-
ance, to force the Biya government to comply with the Harare Declaration.
T H E S D F I N D I S A R R A Y
Of late, the SDF appears to have lost much of its initial appeal. Many party
members who have continued to support the party in the face of frequent har-
assment by the security forces are becoming disillusioned with the party’s
apparent abandonment of its initial social-democratic ideals, as well as with
its leadership’s growing disunity, opportunism and struggles for power. The
party that once stood united behind Fru Ndi is now deeply divided and in
shambles.
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Most observers agree that important divergences began to occur within the
party when its leadership took the controversial decision to enter into state
institutions after the fraudulent 1996 municipal and 1977 parliamentary elec-
tions. It justified its decision in terms of ‘opening a new front against the
regime’. Many party members, however, specifically contested the party’s
entry into parliament, which they perceived as an act of legitimisation of the
very regime that the party had continuously confronted for seven years. More-
over, they wondered how the tiny SDF parliamentary group, which occupied
only 43 out of a total of 180 seats (see Table 1), could pretend to ‘cause an
earthquake in a parliament dominated by the CPDM’. They became more
and more convinced that the party leadership’s eagerness to enter parliament
was first and foremost motivated by its growing tendency to sacrifice vision
and principle for expediency or for what John Fru Ndi himself has called ‘bel-
letics’, the ‘politics of the belly’.47 They claimed that their leaders had lost hope
of ever taking over power since elections continued to be rigged by the regime,
and they were therefore seeking a share of the ‘national cake’ as a form of com-
pensation for their multiple sacrifices for the sake of the party. In June 2000, the
former SDF press secretary, Mr Larry Eyong Echaw, charged that ‘the moral
high ground on which the SDF stood to criticise the CPDM government had
been lost as its parliamentarians are mired in the muddy nature of Ngoa-
Ekelle gombo (that is the prebendal politics in parliament)’. He even alleged
that the party’s chairman, John Fru Ndi, was involved in ‘belletics’ himself
because he ‘had cast his greedy eyes on the salaries and budgets of SDF parlia-
mentarians’.48 His serious allegation was supported a few years later by Sani
Alhadji, the former SDF chairman of the Centre and South Provinces. The
latter claimed that the party did not keep proper accounts, which facilitated
Fru Ndi’s entry into the ‘bourgeoisie’, as is evidenced by his current ownership
of the largest plantations and herds of cattle in the North West. Sani Alhadji
also revealed how Fru Ndi spent the public subsidy of FCFA 456 million for
financing the party’s participation in the 2002 elections: he used most of the
money to recover his twelve-month salary arrears and to buy two luxury
jeeps for private use while allocating only a meagre sum of FCFA 75,000 to
each of the constituencies for campaigning purposes.49
There was also growing resistance to the party’s lack of internal democ-
racy and tolerance towards dissenting views. Real power in the party was
increasingly concentrated in its chairman John Fru Ndi and a small group of
clients, most of them originating from the same ethnic group in the North
West as Fru Ndi, namely the Meta.50 Its most prominent members include
Joseph Mbah Ndam, leader of the SDF parliamentary group, Professor
Clement Ngwasiri, SDF founding member and since 2002 member of parlia-
ment, Emmanuel Yoyo, SDF questor in parliament, and Martin Fon Yembe,
SDF chairman of the North West Province. It is widely believed that they
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have been largely responsible for the party’s shift from confrontational
politics to rapprochement and have been regularly advocating an extension
of the already overwhelming powers of Fru Ndi, which is clearly at odds
with the emphasis on collegiality and democratisation of power in the
party’s statutes. This group of hardliners strongly oppose any fundamental cri-
ticism of the party’s current power structures, policy lines and strategies.
A group of progressive party leaders condemns the increasing concen-
tration of power in the hands of the chairman and his inner circle as being det-
rimental to the development of a democratic culture within the party and the
democratic image the party advertises. The most prominent reformers orig-
inate from the South West Province and Francophone part of the country,
including Professor Tazoacha Asonganyi, the SDF secretary-general, Pro-
fessor Ndiva Kofele-Kale, chairman of the SDF Foreign Affairs Committee,
Chief Alex Taku, SDF secretary for propaganda and education, Sani
Alhadji, former SDF chairman of the Centre and South Provinces, and
Samuel Tchwenko, former Fru Ndi’s personal physician and member of the
SDF national executive committee. They particularly opposed the tendency
of Fru Ndi to personally recruit new party leaders, selecting them almost
exclusively from his group of clients. They were shocked when he decided
to violently intervene in the election of the party’s provincial chairmen in
2000/2001 so as to forestall the election of his critics. They therefore
looked for instruments to curtail his powers in these matters.
In the course of 2001 Professor Ndiva Kofele-Kale tabled a motion during
a national executive committee meeting in which he proposed the creation of
an independent investiture committee responsible for the selection of candi-
dates for party leadership. Not surprisingly, Fru Ndi and his inner circle
strongly disapproved of his bold initiative. Two of its members, Joseph
Mbah Ndam and Emmanuel Yoyo, used the North West Provincial Confer-
ence held at Batibo on 13–14 July 2001 to expose what they called the dia-
bolic intentions of Professor Kofele-Kale and his group in proposing a
motion that would strip the national chairman of his powers and thus facilitate
his overthrow.51 In an interview with Radio France International on 20 August
2001, Fru Ndi said that the Kofele-Kale group formed a threat to the unity of
the party and were out to destroy it.52 During the SDF convention in Bamenda
in October 2001, Fru Ndi and his group succeeded in persuading delegates to
vote against the motion.53
The conflict between the two camps exploded after the 30 June 2002
municipal and parliamentary elections. On 6 July, the party’s national execu-
tive committee decided to boycott all the municipal and parliamentary seats
the SDF had won at the polls. This decision was taken to protest against
renewed massive rigging of the elections and to force the regime to conduct
new elections.54 Four days later, however, Fru Ndi unilaterally lifted the
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embargo and it was soon discovered that his action was part of a secret peace
accord with the CPDM that would enable the SDF to negotiate the appoint-
ment of some of its leaders into positions in the Biya government.55 In
protest, a number of reformers, mostly Francophones, then decided to
resign from the party. They accused Fru Ndi of being ‘more dictatorial than
Stalin’ and a staunch tribalist who aimed at transforming the SDF from a
national into a North West party.
Above all, it is no longer clear what the party stands for. Members are con-
fused by the repeated changes in policies and strategies propagated by the
party’s chairman, Fru Ndi. A few examples will suffice here. In the first
years of the party’s existence, Fru Ndi condemned French imperialism and
called for a boycott of French goods. A few years later, he was eagerly
seeking French support after having painfully realised that he could not do
without it in his attempts to seize power. In 1997, he declared: ‘No good
laws, no elections’. Without having been able to revise the electoral system,
he nevertheless called for participation in the 2002 elections. During the
October 2001 party convention in Bamenda, he declared in his policy
speech that his party would resume its confrontational policies of the early
1990s. A year later, however, he concluded a peace treaty with the CPDM
and sought his party’s participation in a broadly based Biya government.
Party members were astonished when, at the end of 2002, he tried in vain
to enter into negotiations with the CPDM about the creation of an independent
electoral commission despite the fact that earlier negotiations on this issue had
utterly failed in 1998.56
As a result of these developments, SDF membership has declined catastro-
phically and the party’s current position is indeed serious. Since the 2002 par-
liamentary elections, its influence has been largely restricted to its traditional
stronghold, the North West Province. The huge crowds attending SDF rallies
and demonstrations have decreased in numbers considerably. Most intellec-
tuals inside and outside the party no longer take Fru Ndi seriously, having
come to consider him as a major obstacle to democratic change. Increasingly
they are asking for his resignation to save the party from total collapse.
C O N C L U S I O N
This study has attempted to show that the SDF, led by John Fru Ndi, has
achieved significant success in mobilising the people for social-democratic
change in Cameroon, with the party rapidly becoming one of the largest
and most popular opposition parties on the African continent. Paradoxically,
the party has failed to either capture power or force the Biya regime to
bring about any political transformations that could have deepened and conso-
lidated the country’s democratic transition. The euphoria that characterised
THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT IN CAMEROON 19
the early period following the SDF’s appearance on the political scene has
been greatly reduced and has made way for disillusionment. The party
appears to have lost most of the dynamism that made it a critical force in
the country’s politics in the early 1990s.57
Several reasons have been given in this article to explain the SDF’s failure
to seize power and effect social-democratic change in the country. First, the
party was unable to reach consensus on the Anglophone problem, leading to
frequent confrontations between Anglophone and Francophone party leaders
and, eventually, to several defections, dismissals and resignations. Second,
the incumbent regime has used its control over the state apparatus to set
increasing limitations on the freedom and functioning of opposition parties.
Moreover, it has been able to divide the opposition, thereby capitalising on
existing ethno-regional tensions and conflicts. It has also exploited to the
full the ambivalent and inconsistent role of western donors and creditors
towards democratic governance in the country. The IMF and the World
Bank depend upon the ruling regime’s continuous cooperation for the success-
ful implementation of the structural adjustment programme to such an extent
that they tend to confine themselves to quiet diplomacy, except in cases of
extreme violations of human rights. Conversely, they decline to negotiate
with the opposition. They have even expressed their strong disapproval of
certain oppositional actions, such as the 1991 ‘ghost town’ campaign, which
they perceived as a public onslaught on the already shattered national
economy, and as obstructing structural adjustment.58 Undoubtedly, in its
struggle for survival in the early 1990s, the Biya regime owes a special debt
to France, which has tried to safeguard its economic interests in Cameroon
by regularly assisting the regime in overcoming internal and external opposi-
tion to its rule.
And last but not least, following its failure to seize power, the SDF leader-
ship has become increasingly divided about future lines of action and strategy.
It appears to be becoming more and more trapped in the regime’s logic of
démocratie apaisée – the transformation of confrontational politics into par-
ticipation in state institutions – providing ample space for opportunism and
prebendal politics. In many respects, the party has come to resemble the
ruling CPDM party: patron-client relationships, a lack of internal democracy,
intolerance of dissenting views, and the absence of any clear vision or pro-
gramme for Cameroon’s ‘future’.59
It is interesting to observe that two recent studies based on extensive
samples of election results have come to totally different conclusions about
the future of multi-party systems in Africa. On the one hand, Van de
Walle’s study presents a rather pessimistic view, emphasising the illiberal
nature of most of the new African democracies, their characteristic centralisa-
tion of power around the presidency, and the pervasive clientelism that
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structures the relationship between the state and the citizenry.60 On the other
hand, Lindberg’s study offers a more optimistic view, claiming that there have
been significant improvements in the democratic quality of competitive elec-
tions in Africa in terms of participation, competition and legitimacy.61 In my
study, I have provided substantial evidence that Cameroon belongs among
what Lindberg calls ‘deviant cases’ in a generally more promising trend in
Africa. While Lindberg largely fails to account for such deviant cases, my
study shows that Van de Walle’s explanatory framework appears to be
more helpful in explaining why liberal democracy in Cameroon has stalled.
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